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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 860243 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction by guilty plea 
for the offense of burglary, a third degree felony, on or about 
June 17, 1983, in violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Richard C. Davidson presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged by information with burglary, a 
third degree felony under Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted upon a plea of 
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guilty of the offense of burglary on September 12, 1983. 
On October 27, 1983, the District Court sentenced 
appellant to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a term 
not to exceed five years. The execution of the sentence was 
suspended and the District Court placed appellant on probation 
for eighteen (18) months. 
On or about May 28, 1985, the District Court, upon 
the State!s Order to Show Cause, found the appellant had vio-
lated the terms of his probation. On April 21, 1986, the 
District Court imposed the sentence of 0 to 5 years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Notice of appeal was timely filed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether appellant is 
an Indian for purposes of his amenability to state court juris-
diction for the offenses alleged against him. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and a 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a Ute Indian whose father is a full-
blooded Ute Indian who resided on the Uintah and Ouray Reserva-
tion at the time of appellant1s birth. Appellant1s mother is 
an Indian of mixed blood. 
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Appellant was born on the reservation and has par-
ticipated as and exercised the heritage of an Indian. He has 
been treated in the Indian health facilities and has been 
reported by the Duchesne County School District as an Indian 
for purposes of federal contributions to education of Indian 
children. 
On or about July 26, 1983, defendant appeared in the 
District Court and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of 
burglary, third degree felony, allegedly committed in Myton, 
Utah. Sentencing was pronounced on September 12, 1983, and 
Judgment and Order placing defendant on probation was signed by 
the Court on October 27, 1983. 
On or about May 28, 1985, the District Court, upon 
the State's Order to Show Cause, found the Defendant had 
violated the terms of his probation and f^xed time for 
sentencing. Sentencing was continued numerous times and defen-
dant was eventually before the Court again on April 21, 1986 
At the sentencing hearing, Defendants newly appoin-
ted counsel, Kirk C. Bennett, provided affidavits and informed 
the Court that defendant was an Indian person and argued to the 
Court that the crimes were alleged to have been committed in 
Myton, Utah, which is entirely within the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation, and pursuant to Federal law, including 25 
U.S.C.S. Section 1321, the State Court was without jurisdiction 
over the person of defendant Clinton Perank. Defendant moved 
the Court for dismissal. The Court received argument, admitted 
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the affidavits, and received Memoranda. The Court then denied 
defendant's Motion and imposed the sentence of 0 to $ years in 
Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The offense alleged against appellant occurred in 
Myton, Utah, which is Indian country within statutory and case 
law definition. 
The appellant, by virtue of the circumstances of his 
birth, is by definition a Ute Indian. In addition, he has 
lived his life as an Indian, has been educated as an Indian, 
has been treated in Indian health facilities, and is racially 
recognized as an Indian. He also has a preponderance of Indian 
blood. By definition and fact, appellant is an Indian within 
the jurisdictional provisions of federal law. 
Because the offense occurred in Indian country and 
because the appellant is an Indian, the courts of the State of 
Utah do not have jurisdiction over appellant for this offense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED OFFENSES OCCURRED IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY. 
U.S.C.A. 18 § 1151 defines Indian country as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of 
any patent, and including rights-of-way running 
k 
through the reservation, . . . . 
The location of the alleged crimes of the appellant, "has 
had continuous recognition as Indian country and it continues 
to be so recognized." Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 716 
F.2d 1298, 1317 (10th Cir. 1983) Doyle, J., dissenting. The 
status of this area as Indian country was affirmed in the Tenth 
Circuit after rehearing. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
773 F.2d. 1087 (10th Cir. 1985). After rehearing, the Court 
found that, except for two specific acts, all of the lands 
lying within the original boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation was Indian country. 
The location of appellant1s alleged offenses lies 
within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
making it within Indian Country. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS A UTE INDIAN WHO QUALIFIES FOR 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION AND THOUGH NOT 
FORMALLY ENROLLED WITH THE TRIBE IS AN INDIAN 
FOR PURPOSES OF AMENABILITY T0 PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION FOR CRIMES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED 
ON INDIAN LAND. 
Article II of the Ute Constitution provides in part: 
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
consist as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names 
appear on the official census roll of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and puray Reservation 
as of July 1, 1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reserva-
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tion who is a resident of the Reservation at the 
time of birth of said children. 
This provision has been held by the Ute Tribal 
Appellate Court in Champoose v. Uintah and Ouray Tribal 
Business Committee (1981) to grant membership status to Indians 
meeting the requirements of Section 1(b), regardless of whether 
they possess a prescribed percentage of Indian blood or whether 
the Tribal Committee has enrolled them as members of the tribe. 
Appellant was born on the Uintah and Ouray Reserva-
tion to Indian parents. His father is a full-blooded Ute 
Indian who was an enrolled member and resident of the Reserva-
tion at the time of appellant1s birth. His mother is an Indian 
of mixed blood. Under these circumstances, appellant is, by 
defintion of the Ute Constitution, Article II, Section 1(b), a 
member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation. 
There are other means of determining appellant!s 
status as an Indian. In Goforth v. State, 64.4. P.2d 1H, 116 
(Okl.Cr. 1982) the court required two elements to determine 
whether an accused was an Indian under federal law: (1) it must 
appear that he has a significant percentage of indian blood; 
(2) the appellant must be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or by some tribe or society of indians. Id. 
at 116. 
In Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938), one of 
the defendants was a resident of a reservation who maintained 
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tribal relations with the Indians on the reservation, but was 
not enrolled as a tribal member. His mother was a full-blood 
Indian and his father was a half-blood Indian. Both parents 
lived on the reservation and were known as Indians. The court 
held that: 
[T]he overwhelming weight of authority, 
both judicial and statutory, requires the con-
clusion that a child of an Indian mother and 
half-blood father, where both parents are 
recognized as Indians and maintain tribal 
relations, who himself lives on the reservation 
and maintains tribal relations and is recognized 
as an Indian, is to be recognized as an Indian 
. . .within the meaning of "Indian" as used in 
the jurisdictional statute in question. The 
lack of enrollment in the case of Moore is not 
determinative of status. Id. at 31 
[emphasis added]. 
In Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 79 (Wyo. 1982), 
the court cited Pero in formulating a test for determining 
whether status as an Indian exists. Undet this test, the 
person must qualify under one of the following: (1) prepon-
derance of Indian blood, (2) habits of the person, or (3) 
substantial amount of Indian blood plus a racial status in fact 
as an Indian. 
Other courts have found the enrollment issue to be 
merely evidentiary and not determinative of an individual's 
status as an Indian. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th 
Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds 421 U.S. 944, 44 L.Ed.2d 
97, 95 S.Ct. 1671, cert, denied 429 U.S. 1103, 51 L.Ed.2d 554, 
97 S.Ct. 1130 (enrollment or lack of enrollment is not deter-
minative of a defendant's status as an Indian for determining 
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whether a federal court has jurisdiction to prosecute him for 
crimes committed in Indian country); United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 859, 
62 L.Ed.2d 80, 100 S.Ct. 123 (enrollment is a common eviden-
tiary means of establishing Indian status, but is not the only 
means nor is it necessarily determinative). See also U.S. 
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 51 L.Ed.2d 701, 97 S.Ct 1395 (1977) 
and U.S. v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, 
denied 439 U.S. 841, 58 L.Ed.2d 139, 99 S.Ct. 131. 
Where the determination of jurisdiction over an 
Indian accused of a crime depends on his status, "his status is 
a question of fact to be determined by the evidence, and the 
burden of proof is on the government to sustain the jurisdic-
tion of the court by evidence." State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426, 
428 (Idaho 1980). The Allen court pointed out that, under the 
facts of the case, the defendant was recognized racially as an 
indian. The court stated that if the defendant is not recog-
nized jurisdictionally as an Indian, the state must advance 
proof for the contention. Ici. at 428. 
Appellant meets the definitional requirements for 
membership in the Ute Tribe as set forth in Article II, Section 
1 (b) of the Ute Constitution. He also has more than 50% Indian 
blood. In addition, he was born on the reservation, has lived 
his life as an Indian, and has been treated as an Indian by 
governmental entities. Appellant is recognized racially as an 
Indian. Though he is not enrolled as a member of the Ute 
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Tribe, he is entitled under Ute Tribal Appellate Court decision 
for such enrollment. The State has failed to advance evidence 
beyond appellantfs lack of enrollment to disprove his Indian 
status. Appellant is, by all definitions, an Indian. 
POINT III 
THE STATE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER 
THE PERSON OF THE APPELLANT. 
U.S.C.A. 18 § 1152 and 18 § 1153 reserve to the 
federal and tribal courts jurisdiction over Indians who have 
committed crimes in Indian country. U.S.C.A. 25 § 1321(a) 
permits a State to assume jurisdiction over an Indian for 
crimes committed in Indian country only with the consent of the 
Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country. 
The case law regarding these provisions is well 
settled and establishes without doubt that State courts do not 
have jurisdiction over Indians who have committed crimes in 
Indian country. In appellant!s case, the tribe did not give 
consent to the District Court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
appellant. The State court, therefore, has no jurisdiction 
over appellant for the offense for which he was charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The offense alleged against appellant occurred in 
Myton, Utah v/hich is Indian country within statutory and case 
law definition. 
The appellant, by virtue of the circumstances of his 
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birth, is by definition a Ute Indian. In addition, he has 
lived his life as an Indian, has been educated as an Indian, 
has been treated in Indian health facilities, and is racially 
recognized as an Indian. He also has a preponderance of Indian 
blood. By definition and fact, appellant is an Indian within 
the jurisdictional provisions of federal law. 
Because the offense occurred in Indian country and 
because the appellant is an Indian, the courts of the State of 
Utah do not have jurisdiction over appellant for this offense. 
Counsel respectfully,requests that the Court reverse 
and dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of August, 1986. 
^ ^ ; „ ^ » 
-"KIRK C. BENNETT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
319 West 100 South, Suite B 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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